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Fifteen years after German reunification, the facts about slow regional convergence have born out
the prediction of Barro (1991), except that migration out of East Germany has not slowed down.  I
document that in particular the 18-29 year old are leaving East Germany, and that the emigration has
accelerated in recent years. I document that low wages, high unemployment and increasing reliance
on social security persist across wide regions of East Germany together with these migration patterns.
To understand these patterns, I use an extension of the standard labor search model introduced in
Uhlig (2006, 2008) by allowing for migration and network externalities.  In that theory, two equilibria
can result: one with a high networking rate, high average labor productivity, low unemployment and
no emigration ("West Germany'') and one with a low networking rate, low average labor productivity,
high unemployment and a constant rate of emigration ("East Germany'').  The model does not imply
any obviously sound policies to move from the weakly networked equilibrium to the highly networked
equilibrium.
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1 German reuniﬁcation: 15 years later.
Germany was divided into three parts: West Germany, East Germany and Berlin. These
three parts have been united together on October 3rd, 1990. 15 years later, it is time to
take stock of what has happened since. Fiscal transfers into East Germany have been
massive. According to Busch (2002) for 1991 to 1999, own calculations for 2003, and a
linear interpolation for 2000 to 2002, a total net transfer of 940 billion Euros has been
paid from West to East Germany for the time span from 1991 to 2003. Figure 2 shows
that the transfers have been more than one third of East German GDP on average:
indeed, the absolute amount of the transfers has been steadily rising or barely falling
for most of these years. While approximately 20% of the (gross) transfers have been
used to pay for subsidies to ﬁrms as well as to building infrastructure, approximately
50% have taken the form of direct transfers for socio-political reasons. Due to the
East-West transfers, the per-resident ﬁscal budget of the East German Bundesl¨ ander is
approximately 15% higher than in the West. These transfers have been ﬁnanced mostly
with an increase in debt. Additionally, a “solidarity tax” has raised a total of nearly 90
billion Euros from 1991 to 2000.
Despite (or, possibly, because) of these transfers, convergence of conditions in East
Germany to those in the West have been slow. Indeed, Canova and Ravn (2000) haveshown, that reuniﬁcation is tantamount to a mass migration of low-skilled agents holding
no capital into a foreign country. Using an extension of standard neoclassical growth
theory, they show how this should have let to an investment boom in the absence of
a welfare state, but a prolonged recession in its presence. Thus, the anemic growth in
Germany and many of the reuniﬁcation problems may possibly ﬁnd their cause rather
than their remedy in these massive transfers to the East. This also echoes the warning
of Sinn and Sinn (1993), reiterated in Sinn (2002), against raising the wages in East
Germany too quickly to West German levels.
The slow rate of convergence between regions is another matter, however. Germany
is not unusual in this respect. For disparate regions in a country, the slow convergence
process has been documented e.g. by Barro and Sala-i-Martin in a series of papers,
summarized in their book (1995). Based on this research, Barro (1991) warned against
too much optimism regarding the speed at which East Germany will catch up with West
Germany in a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece. He stated then that “there are substantial
variations in estimates of East German productivity in 1990; a reasonable range is from
one-third to one-half the West German ﬁgure. An extrapolation of the U.S. experience to
the eastern regions of uniﬁed Germany implies that per-capita growth in the East would
be initially 1 1/2 to 2 percentage points per year higher than in the West. This growth
advantage ... means that it will take about 15 years to eliminate one-half of the gap ... If
so, the East would eventually catch up to the West, but in a couple of generations rather
than a couple of years or a couple of decades.” Barro’s forecast turns out to be close to
the current facts. 10 to 15 years after reuniﬁcation, average labor productivity in East
Germany (without Berlin) for 2001 to 2003 is at approximately two thirds the average
labor productivity of West Germany (without Berlin), and therefore pretty much exactly
where Barro predicted it would be. Likewise, the productivity growth rate diﬀerential
between East Germany (without Berlin) and West Germany (without Berlin) for 1999
to 2003 is 1.6%, in line with Barro’s prediction.
The prediction in the Wall Street Journal appears to be a slight misprint, however.
Given a convergence rate of 2% annually, one ﬁnds that exp(−.02n) = .75 is solved by
n = 14.4 and exp(−.02n) = .5 is solved by n = 34.7. I.e., in 15 years, only a quarter of
the productivity gap should have been eliminated, and it would take 35 years to eliminate
2half of it. This indeed is the (corrected) statement in Barro (1996), p.14, with an update
of the analysis in Barro (2002). Compared to that calculation, productivity convergence
appears to be faster, at ﬁrst blush. Figure 1 provides greater detail, using the numbers
from Burda (2006). Productivity convergence appears to have been fast from 1991 to
1993, so the prediction based on the 1991 numbers is far from the facts. Applying
the prediction on the basis of the numbers for 1993, however, works surprisingly well.
Whether the fast productivity growth in 1993 is due to mismeasurement prior to that
date, whether this is due to low-productivity enterprises having simply been shut down,
or whether there really has been a rather dramatic catchup in productivity in 1991 to
1993 might be an interesting subject of further research. My guess is that the former two
explanations are far more likely than the latter. I conclude from this, tentatively, that
the productivity convergence prediction by Barro was right, subject to a productivity
jump between 1991 and 1993, probably due to some data revision or ﬁrm-closing.
His other prediction - the slowdown of migration - did not (yet) pan out, though,
see ﬁgure 3. Barro stated that “the ﬂow of migrants will ... decline over time for two
reasons: ﬁrst, the East’s per-capita income will rise, if slowly, relative to the West’s; and
second, cumulated migration will cause the West’s population density to rise relative to
the East’s, thereby making the West relatively less attractive. The combination of these
two forces implies that the annual number of net migrants will fall to a range of 140,000-
230,000 by the year 2001; the projected cumulative number of migrants for the period
1991-2001 is 1.7 to 2.8 million.”. Migration from East to West Germany was never
quite as high: the total was approximately 0.7 million from 1991-2001, and the average
migration rate for 2001-2003 of approximately 70 thousand is close to the average of the
preceeding ten years. One interpretation is that East Germans were initially “bribed”
with the huge transfers to stay where they are, and that we now witness residual pent-
up migration, as these transfers are scheduled to be gradually phased out. Another
possibility is that migration from East to West Germany will continue to persist, turning
East Germany into a deserted wasteland, except for a few industrial core regions. Since
these migratory pattern diﬀer from those predicted by Barro, I shall investigate them
more closely in section 2.1. I ﬁnd that migration is particularly strong for the age group
of 18 to 29 year olds, and it is particularly strong from the country side and small cities,
3and much stronger than the corresponding pattern for West Germany. It appears that
East Germany is slowly but surely gentrifying and dying.
In light of the analyses of Barro and Sala-i-Martin, one may be tempted to explain
this pattern within the context of standard endogenous growth theories, in line with the
usual explanation of slow regional convergence.
But something is amiss. The disparity between East and West Germany is not the
result of many years of a gradual drifting-apart - as it is the case for the disparate
regions in West Germany, the United States or Japan, which Barro and Sala-i-Martin
have analyzed. Rather, here are two parts of the same country, one of which has been
held back artiﬁcally during the postwar years1.
The regions are homogenous in many ways - the same climate, the same legal system,
the same language and a similar level of general education. Technologies and blueprints
can easily be transferred, capital can easily be moved. The slow rate of convergence
of East to West Germany strikes me as more surprising than usual. In sum, what is
needed is a theory consistent with the following stylized facts:
1. There is persistent migration from East to West Germany, in particular by the
age group 18 to 29.
2. Unemployment in East Germany is higher than in West Germany.
3. Wages are lower in East Germany.
4. Average labor productivity is lower in East Germany, while education levels are
similar or even higher.
5. The welfare system provides for comparable beneﬁts in East and West Germany
to short- and long-term unemployed workers.
6. There have been and continue to be sizeable ﬁscal transfers from West to East
Germany.
1This is similar to the distinction between risk-averse agents self-selecting into civil service job in
West Germany and former East Germans being given a civil service job in East Germany, a distinc-
tion exploited by Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln and Sch¨ undeln (2005) to calculate the impact of risk aversion on
occupational choice.
47. East and West Germany operate subject to the same federal law. Regional diﬀer-
ences in the legal system and regulations are minor.
8. Regional diﬀerences in the educational system are minor.
9. Real estate is cheaper in East Germany.
It certainly is the case that the job-speciﬁc skills and training of the workers in the
East were not suitable to the new capitalist world of the West. However, the current
generation of 18 to 29 year olds, which are leaving East Germany in large numbers, were
small children or at most teenagers by the time German reuniﬁcation happened: their
education and job-speciﬁc training should be on par with that of their age-compatriots
in the West. It is conceivable, that the only way for them to receive apprenticeship
training is to move to westwards - but then again, why do ﬁrms not move eastwards,
exploiting the cost advantage of lower real estate prices, lower wages and compensation?
In Uhlig (2006, 2008), I have therefore sketched a theory of two otherwise identical
regions, but where one region has higher unemployment and lower average produc-
tivity than the other, and where there is continuous, unceasing migration from the
low-productivity to the high-productivity region. A standard labor search model would
predict that the initially higher unemployment in the East should attract relatively more
vacancy creation than in the West. Extending such a model to a two-region world with
migration between them would add another valve for releasing the pressure of inequality
and would eventually simply result in an equalization of the conditions in both regions.
Furthermore, a reasonable parameterization would imply that this convergence happens
quickly. Something more is required to make the diﬀerences persist.
To thwart this convergence, the model in Uhlig (2006, 2008) features network ex-
ternality between producing ﬁrms. While ﬁrms can produce in isolation, selling their
products on some anonymous market, they can often be more productive by specializa-
tion as part of a larger network of ﬁrms. A hotel can outsource many of its services like
cleaning or repairs, provided such services are available from specialized ﬁrms close by.
A machine or car manufacturer may outsource the production of specialized parts.
In section 3 , I discuss this model with respect to German reuniﬁcation. The model
has two equilibria. The “highly networked” equilibrium is the equilibrium, in which
5unemployment is low and average labor productivity is high, characterizing the desti-
nation region (“West Germany”, “vibrant city”, “industrial core”) for migrants. The
“weakly networked equilibrium” by contrast is characterized by high unemployment and
persistent emigration. The possibility to emigrate weakens job creation further, as the
option value of emigration acts like an added unemployment beneﬁt. One may want to
think of this equilibrium as characterizing “East Germany”. Emigration in this model
never stops, eventually turning a dying region into a wasteland.
2 Myth and facts about East Germany
2.1 Facts on Inner-German migration.
The general pattern of migration from East to West Germany since 1991 is shown in
ﬁgure 3. The data counts East Berlin as part of East Germany before 2000, and all
of Berlin from 2000 onwards. What is remarkable about this picture is that migration
from East to West Germany has not come to rest after the initial post-uniﬁcation wave.
Rather, and since 1997, net emigration from East Germany has increased again. Slowly,
but gradually, East Germany is shrinking in population, compared to the West.
Further investigations of East-West-German migration and commuting is presented
in Hunt (2006) and Izem and Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln (2006). Here, in order to examine the
issue of inner-German migration further, I have examined regional data available from
the “‘Statistische ¨ Amter des Bundes und der L¨ ander”, available per
https://www.regionalstatistik.de/genesis/online/logon. Germany is divided into 439
“Kreise” or regions, including the city states Berlin and Hamburg. For each Kreis,
each year from 1995 to 2003 and several age groups, data is available on emigration
and immigration, i.e., reallocations crossing the border of the Kreis. Furthermore, for
2003, detailed population data is available. The data lists the names for each Kreis.
Whenever it contained the word “Stadt”, the German word for city, I have categorized
the Kreis as a city, otherwise as countryside. Obviously, the “countryside” should prop-
erly be regarded also as serving as an extended suburb. Given modern possibilities for
commuting, the distinction is blurred, certainly in a densely populated country such as
6All East West
Total Population:
Number of “Kreise” 439 113 326
popul. in % of total 100 20 80
Large Cities:
Number of “Kreise” 70 12 58
popul. in % of region 28 35 27
... without Berlin, Hamburg:
Number of “Kreise” 68 11 57
popul. in % of region 22 15 24
Small Cities:
Number of “Kreise” 46 15 31
popul. in % of region 3 6 3
Countryside:
Number of “Kreise” 323 86 237
popul. in % of region 68 59 71
Table 1: Distribution of the population in Germany.
Germany. Following the usual convention, I have categorized cities with a total popu-
lation in 2003 of more than 100.000 as a large city and below that as a small city. The
distribution across the various categories can be seen in table 1.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the city sizes in East and West, plotting the log of
the fraction of cities above a certain size versus the log of that size. As is well-known as
Zipf’s law, one often obtains a fairly straight line, see e.g. Krugman (1996) or Gabaix
and Ioannides (2004): the same is true here.
Next, I calculate the migration rates of subpopulations within each of these cate-
gories and for various age groups, expressed in percent of the 2003 population. Figure 7
shows a key pattern: the future work force of East Germany, i.e., the population aged
18 to 29 years, is leaving East Germany in large numbers. While there is considerable
“churning”, i.e., while gross ﬂows are considerably larger than net ﬂows, there is lit-
7tle doubt that gradually and persistently, East Germany is shrinking in the relevant
working-age population. This is also corroborated by ﬁgure 5: essentially, only people
above age 50 stay in East Germany, all others gradually leave. Note also, that the
migration pattern of people below 17 is nearly identical to the migration pattern of the
group aged 30-49, since the former are the children of the latter. I therefore do not plot
this age group in the other ﬁgures.
In ﬁgure 5, migrants crossing the German border are included. This makes a sub-
stantial diﬀerence, as a visual comparison to 3 already shows. While the latter shows
persistent emigration from East to West Germany, 5 seems to indicate that there was
net positive immigration until about 1997. Thus, ﬁgure 6 shows only the numbers for
inner-German migration. The numbers now look bleaker, as it excludes a fairly large
number of immigrants to East Germany from foreign countries. Since both types of num-
bers shed diﬀerent light on the phenomenon, I included both throughout. For example,
ﬁgure 8 is the companion ﬁgure to ﬁgure 7.
The fact that East Germans are leaving East Germany is particularly true for the
country side. Figure 9 compares the migration patterns for various regions and age
groups in East and West Germany. Figure 10 concentrates on inner-German migrants,
i.e., excludes migration crossing the German border. While the country side provides
a stable or even growing environment in West Germany, there is an exodus of young
people in rural East Germany. Cities are generally attractive to young people, but
more so in the West, while people above 30 and their young children (not shown) leave
East German city at a faster rate than in the West. Figure 11 and ﬁgure 12 (for only
inner-German migration) focusses on the migration pattern of people at age 18 to 29,
showing both the rates (in percent of the 2003 population) as well as the cummulative
eﬀect. The cummulative eﬀect needs to be taken with the caveat, that people age,
i.e., the group of 18-29 year olds is replenished by young children, as they age, etc..
Nonetheless, the implied changes in the population of East Germany, in particular,
rural East Germany, and the generational composition of this population is shifting
dramatically and continues to do so, 15 years after reuniﬁcation.
A comparison of ﬁgures 13 and 14 shows the migration pattern of the 18-30 year old
population as a map of Germany, comparing 1995 to 2003. The colors code migration
8from net migration rate of less than -3% (dark red) to more than +3% (dark green).
The diﬀerence between 1995 and 2003 is stark: the net exit from East Germany has
accelerated as an area-wide phenomenon, except for a few small patches, corresponding
to the large cities.
One may not notice the ongoing exodus of the young population in East Germany,
when taking just a snapshot of the population distribution. Figure 15 shows the 18-30
year old per 1000 in 2003 across Germany, with dark red showing low numbers mostly
prevalent in northern, western and far southern Germany – but not Eastern Germany.
However, the comfort in these numbers is only apparent. Figure 16 shows the ratio of
the 18-30 year old in 2003 to the 10-20 year old in 1995, as a (somewhat rough) measure
of whether young people stay or not. Now, East Germany is the area deeply colored in
red, denoting particularly low ratios between 67-101. What is happening is simple to
explain. Before reuniﬁcation, East Germany had a larger birth rate than West Germany:
while the children still grew up in East Germany, they now choose to migrate to the
cities and the West. Thus, with young families and their cildren lacking in the future,
the population in East Germany appears to be aging and declining ever further.
Figure 17 shows that young women lead the way in the exodus: there are particularly
few young women per 1000 in the 18-30 year old population in East Germany. One
should be cautious in overinterpreting these numbers: for the entire map, they range
from 426 (light red) to 551 (dark red), still giving reasonable matching odds for the
males in the lighter areas in East Germany. One interpretation may be, that females
seek out regions populated by employed and higher-earning males and thus migrate. If
so, then these ratios would return to their normal balance, if East Germany were to
prosper just as much as West Germany. That, however, seems unlikely.
2.2 Employment characteristics
Figure 18 shows that earnings2 are considerably lower in East Germany: the white areas
indicate earnings of under 2249 Euros per month per employed worker, whereas the dark
red areas correspond to 2790 Euro per month and more for 2002. Despite labor being
2The ﬁgures for all the following graphs are obtained from the INKAR CD-Rom 2006 by the Bun-
desamtes f¨ ur Bauwesen und Raumordnung.
9cheap in East Germany, unemployment is high, as ﬁgure 19 shows for 2004. Moreover,
the unemployment statistics have gradually worsed over time in East Germany. Fig-
ure 20 shows increases of 3% or more for most of East Germany over the years 1995 to
2004, while matters remained unchanged or even improved in much of West Germany
during the same time. These statistics are mirrored in the facts on the fraction of the
population receiving social security (“Sozialhilfe”). These ratios were was particularly
high in particular in the north and east of Germany, often exceeding even 38% as a
regional average, see ﬁgure 21, and rising in particular in East Germany, but falling in
West Germany, see ﬁgure 22.
A few caveats are in order, though. It is not the case that unemployment aﬀects
young people in particular in East Germany. Figure 23 shows that youth unemployment,
i.e. the fraction of unemployed, who are under the age of 25, is not particularly high in
East Germany and appears to be highest in Southern Germany (which has low levels
of unemployment rates to begin with, however). Also, the employment ratio in East
Germany is not unusually low, as ﬁgure 24 shows for 2003 (with light areas denoting
low employment ratios). This is due to a comparatively high female employment ratio
in East Germany, often exceeding 46% of all employed, as ﬁgure 25 shows.
One may be tempted to believe that high unemployment and low wages in East
Germany may be due to low levels of education and training. While this would be hard
to square with the observed migration patterns, it also is not born out by the facts.
Figure 26 shows that the ratio of employed workers recorded to have “high qualiﬁcations”
is particularly high in East Germany, with ratios often exceeding 7.2%, while ﬁgure 27
shows that the fraction of pupils attending the highest of the three German high school
tracts, the so-called Gymnasium, is typically particularly high in East Germany, with
ratios often exceeding 26%.
103 Applying a model of labor search, migration and
network externalities to German Reuniﬁcation.
3.1 The model
To shed light on these phenomena, I have provided an extension of the standard la-
bor search model in Uhlig (2008), a sketch of which has been provided previously in
Uhlig (2006). Surely, market distortions and policy interference in East Germany have
been big, see Snower and Merkl (2006) and adjustment costs are large, see Burda (2006).
But should we be conﬁdent that East Germany would recover quickly, if all these pol-
icy distortions were to be removed? The modelin Uhlig (2006, 2008) provides a simple
framework to show that this may not be so. It shows that one region (East Germany) can
have higher unemployment, lower productivity and persistent outward migration com-
pared to another region (West Germany) and without any convergence taking place,
despite the absence of policy distortions or costs to moving factors of production (while
the latter is the main cause of the slowdown of convergence in Burda, 2006). Workers
also do not suddenly become more skilled by moving from East to West. Rather, I ar-
gue, that agglomeration eﬀects play a key role, see also Fujita, Krugman and Venables
(1999), Krugman (1996) and Cooper (1999).
A standard labor search model would predict that the initially higher unemployment
in the East should attract relatively more vacancy creation than in the West. Migration
would provide for an additional valve. Something more is needed. The model in Uhlig
(2006, 2008) therefore extends the standard labor search model to allow for migration
as well as network externalities of production. The model closely follow the notation
and exposition of Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005), section 4. The model and some
of its analysis will be restated here for completeness.
For the network externalities, consider a match of a worker and a ﬁrm. In isolation,
production is assumed to be ym (m for “match”). I assume that it is beneﬁcial for this
pair to join a network of enterprises and specialize on some speciﬁc task. Thus, as part of
a network, the production by this pair is now assumed to be yn > ym (n for “network”).
Joining a network is probabilistic. I assume that this probability depends on the ratio
11of non-networked ﬁrm-worker-pairs mt to networked ﬁrm-worker pairs nt: this turns
out to make the model fairly tractable. Thus, let ν = ν(mt/nt) be the instantaneous
probability for a non-networked ﬁrm-worker match to become part of some network of
ﬁrms. Division of labor is beneﬁcial to all: so, the larger the networks, the better. There
is no rivalry in joining a network. Furthermore, the more networks are already present,
the larger shall be the chance of an unmatched ﬁrm to join one. I therefore assume
that ν(·) is decreasing. For simplicity, I assume that ν = νh > 0 for mt/nt ≤ ψ and
0 ≤ ν = νl < νh for mt/nt > ψ and some value ψ > 0, satisfying
νlψ < λ < νhψ (1)
where λ is the exogenous job separation rate for (networked) ﬁrm-worker matches. I
shall write ν, keeping in mind, that this can take one of the two values. I will calculate
the equilibrium for a “guess” for ν and then determine ν with the equilibrium ratio of
mt to nt.
For the migration part, I assume that agents have the option of moving from the
region under consideration to some other outside region. Agents experience a disutility
κ > 0 from moving, expressed in wage-equivalent units. I assume that with some
instantaneous probability φ, a new disutility level κ′ is drawn iid from some distribution
F(κ). Let U be the value to an unemployed worker in the region under consideration
(“East Germany”) and let ¯ U be the value to an unemployed worker in the destination
region (“West Germany”). Upon receiving a new draw of the disutility κ, the worker
will move, iﬀ U ≤ ¯ U −κ. Let κ∗ be value, for which equality is achieved. This modelling
assumption can be seen as a rather stylized way of capturing the fact that young people
in practice ﬁnd it easier to move for a variety of reasons - family considerations, social
networks, habits, etc. - than older people. With this interpretation, the probability
φ is the probability of “rebirth”, with an age ( parameterized as moving disutility)
randomly drawn from the population distribution. The alternative would be to model
a labor search market with life-cycle considerations which gets elaborate fairly quickly.
I let ι be the rate of immigration into the region. For the West, ι should be thought of
as positive. Since migration is from East to West Germany, and since West Germany
is about four times as large as East Germany, I shall ignore the immigration term, and
use the approximation ι = 0 for simplicity.
12The other features are standard and are taken from Rogerson, Shimer and Wright
(2005), section 4, modiﬁed to allow for non-networked as well as networked matches. I
assume that workers can be unemployed, or produce in a match. While unemployed,
workers receive beneﬁts b. Firms can post vacancies at a ﬂow cost rk per unit of time
of posting the vacancy. There is free entry to posting vacancies. Let u be the mass of
unemployed workers and v the mass of vacancies. Matching between vacant positions
and workers happens according to a constant-returns-to-scale matching function. I write
αw = αw (v/u) for the rate at which unemployed workers ﬁnd a job, and αe = αe (v/u) =
αw (v/u)/(v/u) be the rate, at which vacancies are ﬁlled, with αw(·) increasing and αe(·)
decreasing in their argument.
In a match, continuous bargaining assures that the worker receives a share 0 < θ < 1
of the joint remaining surplus from production, which I denote with Sm for matched,
but not yet networked ﬁrm-worker pairs, and Sn for networked ﬁrm-worker pairs. I
assume that there is an exogenous separation rate λ, regardless of whether the match is
networked or not. I assume that workers and ﬁrms discount the future at rate r.
3.2 Analysis and Results
A more detailed analysis of the model is provided in Uhlig (2008), but some key steps
shall be provided here for the sake of completeness. The value of being unemployed is
given by
rU = b + φχ(κ













is the “option value” of moving to the outside region. It depends on U via the cutoﬀ-
level κ∗ = ¯ U − U. Equation (2) shows that the possibility of moving to another region
is tantamount to increasing the beneﬁt level b to
˜ b = b + φχ(κ
∗)
13since the option value of moving increases the value of being unemployed3. Therefore,
equation (2) can be rewritten as
rU = ˜ b + αwθSm (3)
The two equations for the surplus Sm and Sn are given by
(r + λ + ν)Sm = ym − rU + νSn
(r + λ)Sn = yn − rU
I.e., the ﬂow value of the surplus in the networked state is given by current production
minus the ﬂow value of being unemployed (noting that the value of a ﬁrm is zero, due
to free entry). The ﬂow value of the surplus in the non-networked state also reﬂects the
possibility of transiting into the networked state.
These two equations can be combined to yield
(r + λ)Sm = ˜ y − rU (4)
where
˜ y = ˜ y(ν) = ym +
ν
r + λ + ν
(yn − ym) (5)
is an average of the labor productivities4. A higher rate of joining a network increases
ceteris paribus the surplus in the same way that a higher productivity would.
Substituting rU on the right hand side of (4) with (3) and collecting terms in Sm
yields
(r + λ + αwθ)Sm = ˜ y −˜ b (6)
3Equation (2) can be seen from the heuristic equation
U ≈ b + exp
−r∆t
￿
(1 − (φ + αw)∆t)U + φ∆t
Z
κ
max{U, ¯ U − κ}dF(κ) + (αw∆t)θSm
￿
as ∆t → 0.
4This averaged labor productivity ˜ y is generally slightly diﬀerent from the population average labor
productivity, which is given by
ya = ym +
ν
λ − φF(κ∗) + ν
(yn − ym)
14The vacancy posting condition is given per
k = αe(1 − θ)Sm (7)
Use this equation to replace Sm in equation (6). Therefore and as in equation (43)
of Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005), it follows that the matching rates αe and αw
satisfy
r + λ + αwθ
(1 − θ)αe
=
˜ y −˜ b
k
(8)
This equation amounts to a ﬁxed point problem in κ∗. In Uhlig (2008), I provide
a perturbation argument to show that there is a unique ﬁxed point as a continuous
function of φ for φ near zero.
Equation (8) provides a number of key insights into this model. The averaged labor
productivity ˜ y and the “modiﬁed” unemployment beneﬁt ˜ b = b−φχ(κ∗) play the same
role as in the standard model, and provide the channel for the networking and migration
eﬀects here. A lower networking rate ν and a larger migration rate φχ(κ∗) both have
the eﬀect of discouraging job creation, decreasing the job matching rate αw for workers,
increasing the vacancy ﬁlling rate αe for ﬁrms and thus increasing the surplus of a non-
networked match Sm according to equation (7). A lower job matching rate αw decreases
the value of being unemployed U and consequently increases the migration treshold κ∗,
i.e. makes emigration more likely.
The dynamics of the model is examined in closer detail in Uhlig (2008): here, a
sketch shall suﬃce. Let ut be the mass of unemployed workers, and recall that mt is
the mass of workers in a non-networked match and nt the mass of workers in networked
matches. Generally, there will be migration out of the region, and therefore, ut, mt and
nt will not have a constant steady state. Let
πt = ut + mt + nt




, ˜ mt =
mt
πt
, ˜ nt =
nt
πt
as the shares of the total population of workers for each of the three possibilities. I
shall concentrate on the case where these shares are constant. Note that the rate of






With a constant share of unemployed ˜ ut ≡ ˜ u, the population decreases exponentially.
Emigration never ceases, and unemployment as a share of the population remains high.
The region is slowly declining.
In Uhlig (2008), I show that the constant share solution is given as the solution to
the system of equations
˜ uαw = (1 − ˜ u)(λ − φF(κ
∗)˜ u) (10)
ν ˜ m = (λ − φF(κ
∗)˜ u) ˜ n (11)
1 = ˜ u + ˜ m + ˜ n (12)
Given the solution for κ∗ and αw, the ﬁrst equation is a quadratic equation for ˜ u, with





as φ → 0. Given ˜ u, the remaining two linear equations can now be solved for ˜ m and ˜ n.
With equation (8) and for φ suﬃciently low, a lower networking rate ν results in a
lower job ﬁnding rate αw and a higher emigration rate φF(κ∗). Equation (13) further-
more shows that the share of unemployed is also higher. Both, the higher unemployment
share ˜ u as well as the faster emigration rate result in a faster rate of population decrease,
see equation (9).
So far, I have not determined the networking rate ν. A solution to the equations




= λ − φF(κ
∗)˜ u (14)
With (1), the calculated equilibrium is consistent with the step function assumed above
for ν = ν(mt/nt), provided φ or F(κ∗) is suﬃciently small.
A graphical representation of equation (14) is provided in ﬁgure 28. There are two
equilibria relevant for our discussion. The “highly networked” equilibrium is the equi-
librium, in which ν = νh, unemployment is low, and average labor productivity ˜ y(ν) is
16high. In a full general equilibrium, this equilibrium ought to characterize the destination
region (“West Germany”, “vibrant city”, “industrial core”) for migrants, thus ﬁxing ¯ U.
In that region, there is no outward migration. Ignoring inward migration, the equilib-
rium is given by the point W in ﬁgure 28. The “weakly networked equilibrium”, given by
point E in ﬁgure 28, is the network with ν = νl, high unemployment and persistent em-
igration. One may want to think of this equilibrium as characterizing “East Germany”
or, generally, a dying region. Emigration in this model never stops, eventually turning
a dying region into a wasteland. The two equilibria balance two oﬀsetting forces. The
relatively higher unemployment in equilibrium E attracts more vacancy creation than
in equilibrium W. However, the surplus from production is lower in the E equilibrium,
due to the lower networking rate, discouraging vacancy creation.
The two other solutions to (14), shown as points A and B in ﬁgure 28, require
additional diﬀerences between the two regions. At point A, emigration persists despite
a high networking rate. At point B, no emigration takes place despite a low networking
rate. While point B can be understood as the equilibrium in an economy without the
possibility of emigration to a more vibrant economy (or with prohibitively high moving
costs for all), point A requires that the destination region remains more attractive, even
if the rate of networking in both regions is equal.
Interestingly, for large enough values of φ, the equilibrium E disappears. Essentially,
if emigration is fast, new matches come on line rarely, and existing matches are relatively
long lived. As a result, networked matches dominate more than they would in the
absence of migration. Whether this feature should be regarded as a somewhat artiﬁcial
property of this model or a valid prediction requires further research5. The ﬂip-side to
this argument is that the highly networked equilibrium W may also disappear with a
high rate of immigration (which we have ignored in the analysis above), as this triggers
the creation of many new non-networked ﬁrm-worker pairs, overloading the capacity
of existing networks to integrate new members. The slump in West Germany likely
has many causes, but absorbing and integrating a new workforce arriving from East
Germany - as this model would then indicate - may be one of them.
5This feature may be useful for constructing a fully dynamic multi-region version of this model, as
it can be utilized to eventually stop the population collapse.
17The emergence and importance of clusters in East Germany has recently been studied
and documented in Rosenfeld et al. (2004). In future research, their cluster data should
be combined with the migration data of section 2.1 to investigate the implications of
the theory here empirically.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have documented the ongoing exodus from rural East Germany, espe-
cially among the young population. I have documented that wages there remain low
and unemployment high, despite levels of education and training that are on par with
Western Germany. To understand these facts, one must seek a model which allows
agents to improve their situation by migration while at the same time keeping unem-
ployment higher in the sending region. Standard labor search models would predict that
ﬁrms seek out workers in East Germany directly, rather than making them migrate. I
therefore elaborate on a model in Uhlig (2006, 2008), which extends the standard labor
search model with network externalities between producing ﬁrms and reproduces the
East-West-German facts, at least qualitatively.
The networking externality gives rise to a coordination failure in this model, see e.g.
the survey by Cooper (1999). The coordination failure is slightly unusual, though, in
that it is not a collective failure of ﬁrms to decide in favour of networking, but rather a
problem of congestion. Given the masses of non-networked and networked ﬁrm-worker
pairs mt and nt, there is nothing that can be done further, as the networking rate is
assumed to be exogenous. If there is a coordination failure in this model, then it occurs
earlier: given a certain number of networked ﬁrms nt, a lower rate of entry (and thus
higher unemployment!) would result in a higher ratio of networked to non-networked
ﬁrms and would trigger the switch to a higher networking rate νh. One solution would be
to tax entry of ﬁrms in an already depressed region in order to give existing but small
networks a chance to grow at a healthy pace, thereby giving the existing unmatched
ﬁrms a better chance to join. This is likely stretching the implications of this model
too far, though. Rather, a more detailed modelling of the networking process should
be attempted before embarking on policy recommendations. Structural policies, which
18aim at providing fertile grounds for networks of ﬁrms, or which encourage entry of key
ﬁrms, around which networks can crystalize, then seem likely candidates for yielding
beneﬁcial results.
But skepticism is in order. In his Wall Street Journal op-ed piece on German re-
uniﬁcation, Robert Barro (1991) wrote: “No doubt, the slowness of the adjustment and
the substantial movement of persons will create pressures for the German government
to speed up the process. There is, however little in the history of regional growth in the
U.S. and Western Europe to suggest that governments can accelerate convergence... .
The forces of convergence are powerful in the long run, but anything approaching parity
between eastern and western Germany is unimaginable anytime soon.”. Nearly 15 years
later and given the massive ﬁscal transfers from West to East Germany, these insights
may - unfortunately - still be correct.
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Figure 1: Productivity convergence, compared to the 2% convergence prediction of Barro.
Productivity convergence appears to have been fast from 1991 to 1993, so the prediction
based on the 1991 numbers is far from the facts. Applying the prediction on the basis of
the numbers for 1993, however, works surprisingly well. The data is from Burda (2006).
23Figure 2: Fiscal Transfers from West to East Germany.
Figure 3: Migration Pattern for Germany.
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Figure 4: Comparing the distribution of city sizes in East and West Germany.





































Figure 5: Net migration rates for various age groups, East Germany. Only people above
age 50 stay in East Germany, all others gradually leave.

































Figure 6: Net migration rates for various age groups, East Germany, calculated for
inner-German migrants, i.e., excluding migration crossing the German border.
































Figure 7: Gross and net migration of people, aged 18-29, into East Germany, in percent
of the 2003 population of that age group.































Figure 8: Gross and net migration of people, aged 18-29, into East Germany, in percent
of the 2003 population of that age group. Here, only inner-German migration is shown.
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Figure 10: Net migration rates for various age groups and regions, comparing East and
West Germany, inner-German migration only.
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Figure 11: Migration patterns of 18-29 year olds.
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Figure 12: Migration patterns of 18-29 year olds, inner-German migration only.
31Figure 13: Regional net migration in Germany in 1995 for the age group
18-30. Regions colored in dark red experienced an out
ow of 3% or more,
whereas region that are colored dark green experienced an in
ow of 3% of
more, compared to the existing population.
32Figure 14: Regional net migration in Germany in 2003 for the age group
18-30. Regions colored in dark red experienced an out
ow of 3% or more,
whereas region that are colored dark green experienced an in
ow of 3% of
more, compared to the existing population. Note that East Germany is now
considerably more in dark red than in the previous gure.
33Figure 15: Fraction of the 18-30 year old in the total population in 2003,
with dark red indicating low numbers. Note that East Germany exhibits
fairly average numbers, due to high pre-unication birth rates.
34Figure 16: Ratio of the 18-30 year old in 2003 relative to the 10-20 year
old in 1995, with dark red numbers indicating numbers between 67 and 101
percent, while dark green numbers indicate numbers between 162 and 270
percent. This gure documents a dramatic exodus of the young population
from East Germany.
35Figure 17: Regional ratios of females to all 18-30 year old in 2003. The
numbers for East Germany are low compared to West Germany, ranging
typically between 42% and 47%.
36Figure 18: Monthly salaries are low in East Germany in 2002, typically below
2249 Euros, compared to West German levels of 2641 Euros or more in the
somewhat darker red regions. Data and Graph computed with the INKAR
CD ROM 2006.
37Figure 19: Unemployment is high in East Germany 2004, typically above
11%, compared to typical West German levels of 7% to 11% in the north and
below 7% in many regions in the south. Data and Graph computed with the
INKAR CD ROM 2006.
38Figure 20: Change of unemployment between 1995 and 2004, showing in-
creases of 3% or more for most of East Germany compared to no change or
slight improvement in West Germany. Data and Graph computed with the
INKAR CD ROM 2006.
39Figure 21: The fraction of the population receiving social security is high
in North and East Germany, with numbers often exceeding 30%. Data and
Graph computed with the INKAR CD ROM 2006.
40Figure 22: The fraction of the population receiving social security has in-
creased in East Germany from 1995 to 2003, adding more than 50% of re-
cipients in a large number of regions. Data and Graph computed with the
INKAR CD ROM 2006.
41Figure 23: Youth unemployment as a fraction of total unemployment is high
in South Germany. Data and Graph computed with the INKAR CD ROM
2006. Data and Graph computed with the INKAR CD ROM 2006.
42Figure 24: The employment ratio, i.e. the fraction of the population which
is employed, is low to average in East Germany. Data and Graph computed
with the INKAR CD ROM 2006.
43Figure 25: The high employment ratio in East Germany is due to the rela-
tively high female labor force participation. The fraction of employed, who
are female, often exceeds 48% in East German regions. Data and Graph
computed with the INKAR CD ROM 2006.
44Figure 26: The fraction of \highly qualied employees" in 2003 according to
ocial gures tends to be high in East Germany and at above 9% for sev-
eral regions there considerably higher than under 4.4% as in many southern
regions. Data and Graph computed with the INKAR CD ROM 2006.
45Figure 27: The fraction of students attending the top tier (\Gymnasium") of
the three-track German school system is particularly high in East Germany,
often exceeding 30% compared to numbers below 19% in a number of north-
ern and southern regions. Data and Graph computed with the INKAR CD
ROM 2006.
46Figure 28: A Graphical Representation of the Dynamics for the fraction ˜ n of networked
ﬁrm-worker pairs as a function of the ratio of non-networked to networked ﬁrm-worker
pairs, m/n. The equilibrium E (“East Germany”) exhibits low average productivity,
high unemployment and persistent emigration, compared to the equilibrium W (“West
Germany”).
47